Iron Sharpens Iron: PDW Conducts Internal Laser Target Designation Training

The joint fires arena has been my home for most of my adult life. Over the last 16 years of training and operations, I've either delivered or witnessed air-to-ground kinetic effects through just about every method imaginable. 

During the Global War on Terror, I carried a SOFLAM (a man-portable laser system used to illuminate targets for laser-guided weapons) through multiple countries. For the most part, it stayed in my ruck. There was almost always something overhead capable of delivering precision-guided munitions, so the need for an organic laser designator was relatively uncommon. That wasn't because the SOFLAM lacked value—it was because we operated in an environment where there was always an airborne asset to provide laser designation. 

I don't think the next fight looks anything like the last one. 

As the Air Force returns the Combat Air Force to its doctrinal role of air interdiction, the expectation of persistent overhead support becomes much less certain. The generation replacing mine won't always have the luxury of permissive airspace or a continuous stream of aircraft ready to respond to troops in combat. 

So how do we preserve one of the greatest advantages U.S. forces have ever had—the ability to rapidly integrate precision airpower in support of maneuver? 

The answer probably isn't as simple as replacing one platform with another. 

In contested environments, commanders are going to be forced into tradeoffs. They can accept a higher aircraft acceptable level of risk (ALR), or they can reduce the availability of supporting fires thereby increasing the risk to ground forces.  

At the same time, warfare is changing in ways that are obvious to anyone paying attention. Organic sUAS are becoming an extension of the maneuver force, providing reconnaissance, targeting, and increasingly, kinetic effects. 

That doesn't mean traditional air-delivered weapons become less important. 

There will always be targets that require the range, lethality, or desired weapons effects that only aircraft-delivered precision munitions can provide. The challenge is making those effects available without assuming uncontested air superiority or constant airborne support. 

That's where I believe products like the C100 paired with the Leonardo DRS STAG-5 EO/IR gimbal with Laser Target Designator can begin to change the equation. 

The objective isn't simply to field another drone. It's to put the ability to build precision kill chains into the hands of Soldiers, Sailors, Marines, and Airmen operating at the tactical edge. If a small unit can identify, designate, and prosecute a target with the appropriate weapon, regardless of the surrounding threat environment, we've fundamentally expanded the commander's options. 

For someone who's spent over a decade building kill chains at the operational level, that transition feels natural. It won't be natural for everyone else. 

Serious desire to push this capability down to the lowest practical echelon requires a conversation that can't stop with hardware. 

It has to include training and smarter technology. Those two ideas became the foundation for PDW's inaugural internal Laser Target Designator course. We weren't just teaching our pilots how to operate a laser designator. We were trying to answer bigger questions, such as…  

How much training does someone really need before they can safely and effectively build a precision kill chain?  

Which tasks genuinely require experience, and which ones can be standardized?  

Where can automation reduce cognitive workload without removing sound tactical decision-making? 

Our first class consisted of six students and two instructors. One instructor focused on fires integration, close air support fundamentals, and kill chain construction. The second focused on the STAG-5 hardware and software. 

The student backgrounds couldn't have been more different. One was a retired military member and SOTAC graduate with years of operational experience. Another was a former SWAT officer with zero close air support background. The rest landed somewhere in between. 

What surprised me wasn't how differently they started. It was how similarly they finished. 

Given structured instruction, clearly defined SOPs, and consistent standards, people from very different backgrounds were able to construct safe and effective precision kill chains. Experience still mattered—it always will—but it wasn't the deciding factor in achieving competency. 

Efficiency is a different story. 

During our live-flight practical exercises, it became obvious where students were spending the most time and mental energy. They immediately began identifying software features, workflow improvements, and automation that would make each step of the Find, Fix, and Finish process faster without compromising safety. 

As engineers, instructors, and operators, we can make educated assumptions about what will help the warfighter. We can simulate scenarios, develop software, and refine procedures. We can anticipate the needs of the warfighter, but none of that replaces operational feedback. 

The warfighters who employ these systems will ultimately define what combat-ready looks like. 

Our job is to listen, adapt, and continue building tools that reduce workload while preserving sound tactical decision-making. Technology alone won't solve the problem, but training alone won't solve it either. The future belongs to the combination of both. 

If we're going to continue giving small units access to precision effects in increasingly contested environments, we have to make those effects easier to employ, easier to sustain, and easier to trust. That's not just a technology challenge—it's a training challenge, a doctrine challenge, and ultimately a leadership challenge. 

That's the path we're working toward.